American broadcasting to Cuba: the cold war origins of radio and TV marti by PROGLER, Joseph
American Broadcasting to Cuba（PROGLER）2011】 159© Institute of Internatio al Relations and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University
Abstract
Current American debates on broadcasting to Cuba are 
dominated by opponents who cite economic concerns and 
proponents who cite political goals. This article seeks to provide 
historical context for these debates by investigating the formative 
years of Radio and TV Marti during the Reagan administration 
and shows that the current debates were present from the 
beginning, that the political side prevailed, and that the politics of 
Radio and TV Marti originated with Cold War goals and ideology. 
The article further observes that a third position, which saw the 
broadcasts in terms of cultural exchange, was undermined by the 
dichotomy of economics and politics.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1985 the American government began broadcasting to Cuba on Ra-
dio Marti, followed in 1990 by TV Marti. Both were ironically named after 
the Cuban independence icon Jose Marti, who once said, “The scorn of our 
formidable neighbor who does not know us is our America’s greatest dan-
ger” (cited in Manuel, 1991, p. iv). Prior to implementation, the broadcasts 
were debated in the US Congress and they remain controversial today. A 
2006 report from the Council on Hemispheric Affairs termed the broad-
casts “a bridge to nowhere,” noting that “almost half a billion dollars have 
been thrown away in the project” (Harr, 2006). The broadcasts reach “less 
than 1% of Cuba’s 11 million residents,” according to a report by the US 
Government Accounting Office, and the Cuban government views the 
broadcasts as “enemy propaganda” (Miroff, 2010). Perhaps in a recognition 
of their own shortcomings, the broadcasts were recently restructured to at-
tract a younger audience by focusing on “practical and entertaining pro-
gramming” (Tester & Tucker, 2011). In the present climate of US govern-
ment budgetary woes, it has been suggested that the broadcasts ought to 
be eliminated as a vestige of American Cold War politics (Amerigian, 
2011). An examination of the debates and policies during the formative 
years of Radio and TV Marti shows that the broadcasts were initiated by 
the Reagan administration in a climate of 1980s Cold War revival and that 
they embodied characteristics of American policy and ideology from the 
1960s and 1970s.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR AMERICAN BROADCASTING TO CUBA
Soon after the Cuban revolution deposed an American-backed dictator 
in 1959, Fidel Castro met with US vice-president Richard Nixon to explain 
the revolution and explicitly stated that “we are not communists” (United 
Press International, 1959). When the new revolutionary government be-
gan to nationalize the vast tracts of Cuba’s arable land owned by foreign 
entities, mainly American corporations, the US government saw the revo-
lution as a threat to its interests in the region. In 1960, the US initiated 
covert action against Cuba to bring about “replacement of the Castro re-
gime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and 
more acceptable to the US,” as stated in a secret memo to President Eisen-
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hower (Glennon, 1960). Coupled with this covert action, the American gov-
ernment froze Cuban assets in the US and imposed an embargo that 
stands today. In 1961, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
backed supporters of the previous regime in the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Al-
though Cuba was 90 miles off the coast of the US, American hostility to-
ward the revolution pushed the Castro government into the Soviet sphere 
of influence, initiating a standoff that peaked with the Cuban Missile Cri-
sis in 1962. Soon thereafter, the US mounted operations to destabilize its 
new Cold War adversary to the south.
Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, the US government used 
various tactics against Cuba and Castro, including assassination attempts 
(Agee, 1975). Many proposed tactics were intended for psychological effect. 
Some were bizarre: attempting to poison Castro with a botulism pill in his 
milkshake; slipping Castro LSD to make him appear to be losing grip on 
reality; and using female hormones to cause Castro’s beard to fall out 
(Marks, 1979, pp. 17, 74, 98). Attempts to destabilize Cuba’s economy with 
biological weapons have been reported, although not conclusively proven, 
including: a CIA sponsored biological weapons attack in 1964 that caused 
Cuba’s sugar crop to fail; the introduction of African swine fever virus into 
Cuba in 1971 by an anti-Castro group, with at least tacit support of the 
CIA, which necessitated the slaughter of 500,000 pigs to prevent an epi-
demic; and attempts to ruin Cuba’s tobacco crops. Suspected biological at-
tacks have also targeted the Cuban population, notably an outbreak of 
dengue hemorrhagic fever that infected 350,000 people and killed 156. Ac-
counts of these incidents are based on declassified CIA documents ob-
tained through the Freedom of Information Act (Piller & Yamamoto, 1988, 
pp. 49-50, 72-3), although the Cuban government has alleged that there 
were many others.
The United States Information Agency (USIA) and the US Army 
worked with the CIA to implement propaganda in Cuba. Prior to the Bay 
of Pigs Invasion, the CIA had been broadcasting propaganda to Cuba on 
Radio Swan, a semi-covert station operating as a commercial station. Ra-
dio Swan was part of a coordinated effort by the CIA to “create the proper 
psychological climate” for the ensuing invasion and the anticipated col-
lapse of the Castro government (Soley & Nichols, 1987, p. 181). Program-
ming was produced by CIA operatives in Miami and featured news, music, 
drama, and commentaries. Participants in Radio Swan included members 
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of Cuban exile groups, one of which was a young Jorge Mas Canosa (Soley 
& Nichols, 1987, p. 178). Mas Canosa would later resurface as a major 
player in the Reagan administration’s renewed propaganda operations 
against Cuba.
In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was proposed to ex-
pand the American media war against Cuba by including television broad-
casts:
Edward R. Murrow, the legendary broadcast journalist and then-direc-
tor of USIA, reported in a secret memo to President Kennedy on a 
new weapon in the US propaganda arsenal against Cuba. In collabo-
ration with the Defense Department, USIA had developed the capabil-
ity to beam television programs into Cuba from airborne transmitters. 
The previously unpublished memo, declassified and released by the 
Kennedy Presidential Library, describes how taped television pro-
grams could be broadcast into Cuba from two specially equipped DC-6 
aircraft flying at a maximum of 18,000 feet just outside Cuban air-
space. USIA was responsible for the programming, but the “stratovi-
sion” planes were under the command of Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, 
America’s prime psychological warrior. (Nichols, 1988, p. 24)
The plan to supplement radio broadcasting with television was aban-
doned by Kennedy after Murrow advised that it should only be used in 
times of actual war, for retaliatory strikes against Cuba, or during an in-
vasion of the island. Although TV broadcasts did not materialize in the 
1960s, they indicate a cooperative effort between USIA and the US Army 
to mount a propaganda operation involving psychological warfare against 
Cuba. Both the radio and TV initiatives were renewed by the Reagan ad-
ministration.
The involvement of Lansdale suggests that Cuba broadcasting was a 
“psychological operation,” PSYOP in Army lingo. During the 1970s and 
into the 1980s, USIA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) expressed “continuing in-
terest in PSYOP,” and they constituted the “major part of the PSYOP 
framework at the national level” (McLaurin, 1982, p. 62). USIA advised 
the DOD on “psychological implications of foreign public statements and 
actions in the defense field, and works directly with the various services in 
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Washington and commands abroad to increase psychological support for 
US policies” (McLaurin, 1982, p. 68). USIA had “responsibility for the over-
all coordination of US PSYOP in stability operations where the military 
has not yet been assigned command responsibility” (McLaurin, 1982, p. 
71). A goal of PSYOP is “the planning and executing of specific psychologi-
cal operations campaigns which employ communications media and other 
techniques to cause selected foreign groups and individuals to behave in 
ways that support US national and military objectives” (Radvanyi, 1990, p. 
27).
PSYOP can be overt or covert, and used in peacetime or wartime, but 
the US has deployed it primarily in times of actual or perceived war (Lord, 
1989, p. 19). As a specific type of propaganda, PSYOP involves “planned 
use of communications to influence human attitudes and behavior” con-
sisting of “political, military, and ideological actions conducted to create in 
target groups behavior, emotions, and attitudes that support the attain-
ment of national objectives” (Paddock, 1989, p. 45). After WWII, radio oper-
ations were used in the Korean war, and the 6th PSYOP Battalion active 
in Vietnam in the mid-1960s included a 50,000 watt radio station (Pad-
dock, 1989, pp. 46-9). PSYOP units were set up in several countries, in-
cluding Panama, to support the war. The Reagan era saw a renewed in-
vestment in rebuilding PSYOP, which became a crucial tool in the “war of 
ideas” against communism (Paddock, 1989, p. 50). PSYOP has an institu-
tional base in USIA and the US Army but is primarily used for low inten-
sity conflicts (Odom, 1990, p. 8-9), with the main focus during the Cold 
War being on the Soviet Union and Cuba (Tugwell, 1990, pp.75-6).
The implementation of Radio and TV Marti coincided with a revival of 
PSYOP during the Reagan administration, when there was a “rethinking 
of the role of political and psychological factors in US national strategy” 
(Lord, 1989, p. 20). Efforts were made to integrate foreign policy goals with 
the resources of USIA and create a role for military PSYOP during peace-
time (Radvanyi, 1990, p. 33-4). Radio and TV Marti may not fit the battle-
field deployment of PSYOP, because with the possible exception of the Bay 
of Pigs Invasion the US has not been engaged in any direct military action 
against Cuba. However, evidence suggests an ongoing campaign to wage 
psychological warfare against Cuba and that this is part of American Cold 
War propaganda through radio and television broadcasting.
Against this historical backdrop, I want to focus in more detail on Ra-
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dio and TV Marti, the continuation of which has been recently debated in 
the US government, as noted above. To better understand the current de-
bates, we can look at the debates during the Reagan administration in the 
1980s and how they informed subsequent US broadcasting policy into 
Cuba.
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE RAND CORPORATION
Early in the Reagan administration, efforts to establish US govern-
ment sponsored broadcasting to Cuba were vigorously pursued. The De-
partment of State and the US Air Force commissioned an influential think 
tank, the RAND Corporation, to help formulate foreign policy toward 
Cuba. RAND had previously conducted studies for the State Department 
and US military, in particular on the Vietnam War, but also with a general 
emphasis on the communist bloc in the Cold War era. In 1982, RAND sub-
mitted its report on “a strategy for dealing with Cuba in the 1980s” (Gon-
zales & Ronfeldt, 1982), including recommendations for radio and TV 
broadcasting.
Urging use of “diplomatic leverage instruments” to “exploit Cuba’s 
vulnerabilities,” the RAND report stresses the importance of coordinating 
the timing and content of “pressures” and “inducements,” and offers advice 
for “exploiting vulnerabilities through Radio Marti.” It stresses the neces-
sity to “intensify the domestic strains confronting the Castro regime” in 
two ways: 1) provide “credible and relevant” information that might be 
“appealing to the Cuban population on the island” to challenge Cuba’s “pe-
dantic, selective, and politicized” information system, and 2) counter the 
Cuban government’s portrayal of American politics and culture. On the 
latter point, there is no mention of cross-cultural exchange toward inter-
cultural understanding.
In providing guidelines for broadcast content, the RAND report sug-
gests highlighting areas in which the Cuban regime is deemed to be vul-
nerable, including economic mismanagement, broken promises to the peo-
ple, subordination to the Soviet Union, detrimental foreign policy, 
exclusivity of the ruling elite, and, perhaps most interestingly, betrayal of 
the original ideals of the revolution. The authors insist that Radio Marti 
can “intensify elite-mass divisions within Cuba” and “erode popular sup-
port for the regime and thus weaken it,” emphasizing that “great care will 
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have to be taken in the programming and content of Radio Marti for it to 
have optimal political-psychological impact on Cuban society in the years 
ahead” (Gonzalez & Ronfeldt, 1982, pp. 112-16). The latter statements 
frame Radio Marti as a PSYOP intended to support specific long term po-
litical goals of the US.
The RAND report emphasizes assuring listenership, establishing 
credibility, maintaining relevancy, and creating broad appeal, but reveals 
an ideological awareness by stating that to be an “effective instrument for 
leverage” Radio Marti’s “political approach may well have to be considera-
bly to the left of the Administration as well as the Cuban exile communi-
ty” (Gonzalez & Ronfeldt, 1982, pp. 112-16). The authors suggest that pro-
gramming can put the regime on the defensive by using recordings of 
Castro’s speeches as examples of unfulfilled promises. They also recom-
mend programs satirizing the regime and communist life in Cuba, and 
others such as a Marxist tinged analysis emphasizing emerging class 
struggles, and news coverage of relevant world events including repression 
in communist countries and Cuba’s military involvement in Africa. Above 
all, they assert, Radio Marti should entice and hold listeners with enter-
tainment and music. These recommendations shaped subsequent US con-
gressional debates on Radio Marti, which in turn further reveal the Cold 
War origins of the prospectus.
CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES ON RADIO MARTI
The initial debates on implementing Radio Marti focused on the possi-
bility of retaliatory radio interference, referring to the clandestine radio 
wars between the US and Cuba during the 1960s and 1970s that wrought 
havoc on the American airwaves and which deteriorated US-Cuba rela-
tions. In 1979 Cuba announced construction of two 500 kilowatt transmit-
ters capable of sending radio signals anywhere in the US and, according to 
accounts of a 1981 meeting in Washington, Cuban officials intended to uti-
lize the transmitters to broadcast programming on American frequencies 
(Frederick, 1986, pp. 5-50). These and other episodes indicate that Cold 
War hostilities continued to inform the congressional debates. 
The US House of Representatives (USHR) debated the Radio Marti 
bill in 1982, with 80 amendments pending. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), a strong 
opponent of Radio Marti, referred to it as the “massive domestic radio 
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broadcasting interference act” and the “John Foster Dulles Cold War men-
tality memorial radio broadcasting to Cuba act,” expressing concern that 
the bill might be used to incite military confrontation with Cuba. Other 
opponents stressed that it would be detrimental for foreign policy, and 
that the US should move toward decreasing regional tensions. Jim Leach 
(R-Iowa) stated that “none of us want this administration to embark on an 
inciteful, rhetorical, counterproductive, and potentially explosive course of 
repercussions with the government of Cuba,” and suggested that Radio 
Marti be affiliated with the Voice of America (VOA) to insure that it will 
“broadcast responsible news rather than propaganda.” The debates were 
undermined because US Navy engineers had already begun constructing a 
new transmitting facility for Radio Marti in Florida (Gallimore, 1982).
Proponents of Radio Marti stressed the right of Cubans to free speech. 
This view was exemplified by Thomas Enders, Assistant Secretary for In-
ter-American Affairs, who stated before congressional committees that Ra-
dio Marti can “provide to the Cuban people an alternate, reliable source of 
news and commentary about events taking place in their homeland,” in-
sisting that the broadcasts can help Cubans hold their government ac-
countable (Enders, 1982a & 1982b). Echoing the views of other propo-
nents, Enders suggested that Radio Marti can give Cubans “alternatives 
to the distorted, censored news that is being offered by a government that 
rules not for the people but for itself,” and that programming can provide 
“a source of news and entertainment that is not manipulated by the state.” 
However, he warned against Radio Marti inciting rebellion, as “it would be 
immoral and irresponsible to set a people against a government that mo-
nopolizes the means of coercion.” To ensure listenership, Enders suggested 
that Radio Marti be objective, varied, and tuned to the needs of Cubans, 
and that it speak to “young people of the sports and music they love.” Em-
phasizing the political dimension, Enders concluded his testimony saying 
that Radio Marti can promote freedom of information, which “has been 
consistently denied to the Cuban people since Castro came to power in 
1959,” and that “democracy thrives in the light of controversy; communism 
panics at the sound of truth.”
The political proponents prevailed. On 20 May 1985, bill HR 5427 was 
passed and became Public Law 98-111 initiating American broadcasting 
into Cuba.
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CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES ON TV MARTI
Three years after Radio Marti began broadcasting, a bill was proposed 
for TV Marti. The ensuing debates featured opponents and proponents fur-
ther evincing polarity between politics and economics. In a 22 September 
1988 hearing, media scholar John Nichols called TV Marti an “electronic 
Platt Amendment” (USHR, 1988, p. 18), referring to an American amend-
ment to the Cuban constitution after independence from Spain in 1901, 
which became a treaty between the US and Cuba in 1903, and which al-
lows the US a “right to intervene” in Cuban affairs if the former’s interests 
are threatened (Brenner, 1988, p. 30). Nichols warned that the Cuban gov-
ernment could jam the TV signal, and that the venture would waste tax-
payer dollars. Philip Brenner, a Cuba scholar testifying at the same hear-
ing, argued that the costs are not justifiable and that TV Marti may not 
reach its audience, noting that the US “might be able to provide some new 
entertainment for [Cubans] - especially of the sort that is on US televi-
sion,” but that “Cubans already watch Hollywood films, which are popular, 
listen to Western rock music, and even receive some US television from 
Florida stations.” He expressed doubt that Cubans were listening to any-
thing other than the entertainment programs on Radio Marti, so “there is 
little certainty that Cubans would pay any attention to TV Marti news 
and good reason to think they would ignore it. Its controversial source 
would make it suspect” (USHR, 1988, p. 36). Pointing to the potential for 
mutual cultural exchange, Brenner suggested alternative ways to reach 
Cubans. This was seconded by the Cuban Interests Section spokesperson 
in Washington, Ramon Sanchez-Parodi: “Cuba’s opposition to TV Marti is 
based on principle, not content. We would be happy to allow reciprocal 
transmission. We will oppose TV Marti not because of its transmission but 
because of the way it is being pursued - without regard to our sovereignty” 
(USHR, 1988, p. 38). Unfortunately, these voices were undermined by 
those with political and economic concerns.
Among the most vocal proponents of the Radio and TV Marti broad-
casts was Jorge Mas Canosa, a wealthy and powerful Cuban exile residing 
in Miami, who as we have seen had a history of involvement in counter-
revolutionary activities against Cuba dating back to CIA sponsored Radio 
Swan. Testifying at the TV Marti hearings, Mas Canosa attempted to re-
fute claims made by opponents that Castro might jam TV Marti, stating 
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that “Castro never jammed Radio Marti once it went on the air, despite re-
peated threats to do so. The reason he did not is simple. Castro has always 
boasted he can win any contest of ideas with the US. He would, therefore, 
also jeopardize his credibility by jamming TV Marti” (USHR, 1988, p. 44). 
Mas Canosa ridiculed forecasts that Castro would retaliate, citing evi-
dence reportedly showing it was technically impossible to jam the signals.
These debates continued on 4 May 1989 in a hearing before the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations, where there was considerable skepti-
cism on the benefits of broadcasting to Cuba. Despite the skepticism, 
USIA director Bruce Gelb felt “strongly that we have seen the success of 
Radio Marti in bringing accurate news about Cuba to Cubans in their 
country. It has been terribly helpful that the freedom loving people of 
Cuba who come to this country can make great contributions to our do-
mestic life, economically and in every other way as well as being available 
to help with broadcasting to Cuba” (US Senate, 1989, p. 20). Gelb conclud-
ed that broadcasting to Cuba “is supported by the President, and natural-
ly, if it is supported by the President, I am right there with him.” As with 
Radio Marti, proponents prevailed and on 16 February 1990, bill HR 3792 
became Public Law 101-246, part D of which authorized television broad-
casting into Cuba.
After considering several methods harkening back to the Cold War 
era, such as broadcasting from a ship or plane, USIA arrived at the cur-
rent procedure of producing programs for TV Marti in Washington DC and 
then sending the completed image to a satellite that transmits it to Cudjoe 
Key Air Force Station near Key West, Florida. The signal is then sent to an 
aerostat (something between a blimp and a weather balloon) tethered 
12,000 feet in the air, which has a transmitter that can beam a signal into 
Cuba (Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting [ABCB], 1991, p. 13).
Soon after the TV Marti broadcasts began, the Cuban government, as 
predicted, jammed the signal and reports suggested that programming 
was not reaching its intended audience. Furthermore, contrary to Mas Ca-
nosa’s claim, the Cuban government also proceeded to jam Radio Marti 
(French, 1990a & 1990c; Cuba starts jamming, 1990; Havana jamming 
broadcasts, 1990). A Pacifica Radio broadcast on 14 April 1992 featured a 
report by its correspondent in Havana, Gail Reed, who observed that “the 
latest attempt by Washington to broadcast Tele Marti to Havana began 
last week and continued yesterday, but US technology has so far been 
American Broadcasting to Cuba（PROGLER）2011】 169
foiled by a Cuban mechanism which blocks the transmission.” Broadcast-
ing continues to be jammed today despite the earlier warnings, suggesting 
that the US government is committed to Radio and TV Marti on grounds 
of politics and ideology, rather than communications and practicality. Poli-
tics are also evident in a 1992 statement made by the director of broad-
casting for TV Marti, Antonio Navarro, who said that broadcasting is 
“mandated” by the US government and must continue despite the jam-
ming, because it is “a thorn in the side of the Cuban communist govern-
ment” and that the US government must “not hand them a victory by 
stopping it” (Laird & Hall, 1992).
THE ECONOMICS OF BROADCASTING TO CUBA
While proponents of the Cuba broadcasts emphasized the Cold War 
tropes of freedom and truth, opponents focused on the cost of broadcasting. 
A point of contention has been whether they are worth the considerable 
appropriation of public funds. As of 2011, the US government has spent 
half a billion dollars on Cuba broadcasting. A complete accounting is be-
yond the present scope, but the pattern of expenses was established in the 
formative years. Before the House Appropriations Committee in 1990 
(USHR, 1990, p. 807), USIA provided a summary of appropriations for Ra-
dio Marti. For 1989, actual funding was $11,175,000, and estimated needs 
for 1990 and 1991 were $12,537,000 and $15,069,000, respectively. When 
it began in 1985, the budget was $10 million, and by 1991 there was an in-
crease in allocations to USIA for Radio Marti, partly due to increased pro-
gramming time. Initial broadcasts aired 14.5 hours a day; by 1990 the sta-
tion was on 24 hours a day. Most funding went toward salaries for a large 
staff, including 47 for news and programming, with 45 stationed in Wash-
ington and 2 in Miami, 30 for research and 30 for technical operations, and 
28 for program direction and administration, bringing the total employees 
for Radio Marti to 135 (USHR, 1990, p. 811). Programming cost $1,000,959 
in 1989, while the estimates for 1990 and 1991 were, respectively, 
$1,039,036 and $1,081,676 (USHR, 1990, p. 812). Within the programming 
budget, as reported by USHR (1990, p. 813), 1989 expenses were $18,777, 
while estimates for 1990 and 1991 were $27,325 and $28,227, respectively. 
TV Marti spent $1,464,282 in 1989, mostly for a staff of 159; estimates for 
1990 and 1991 were $21,936,938 and $18,100,000, respectively (USHR, 
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1990, p. 922). These figures do not include $7.5 million for equipment and 
startup costs. This brief survey suggests the scope of the operation in its 
early years, although expenses have increased significantly since then and 
the cost of broadcasting to Cuba remains contested.
COLD WAR DYNAMICS IN RADIO AND TV MARTI
Radio and TV Marti are run by USIA under the auspices of the US 
State Department. USIA handles other media services, including VOA and 
WorldNet, and administers the Fulbright Program, the University Affilia-
tions Program, the International Visitor Program, the International Youth 
Exchange, and the Artistic Ambassador Program, as well as several pri-
vate sector programs and a library support program (USIA, 1987a, pp. 
8-9). Because of its central role in administering and funding Radio and 
TV Marti, it is important to examine USIA policy for evidence of its Cold 
War ideology.
The director of USIA during the Reagan era, Charles Z. Wick, de-
scribed its mission as “telling the world about the meaning of freedom” 
(Wick, 1985a, p. 520). Coterminous with the Cold War, USIA was launched 
during the Truman administration and bolstered under Eisenhower. Much 
of its work focused on the Soviet Union and communism (Schiller & Alex-
andre, 1991). Wick (1985b, p. 16) said that Eisenhower “believed that 
America’s message of freedom and opportunity could win the war of ideas.” 
When Radio Marti began broadcasting in 1985, he announced that “after 
25 years of government censorship, the people of Cuba are hearing news, 
commentary, and other information about events in Cuba and elsewhere 
promoting the cause of freedom in Cuba” (USIA, 1985c). Wick linked Radio 
Marti to the mission of USIA, stating that it “went on the air pledging to 
‘look for the truth’ - the same ideals expressed more than 40 years ago 
when the Voice of America promised to ‘tell the truth’ to a war-torn world, 
hungry for peace” (USIA, 1985c). While calls for freedom and truth make 
for good speeches, there is another dimension to the broadcasts that places 
these slogans in the framework of Cold War politics.
Despite, or perhaps because of, his history as a CIA operative in coun-
terrevolutionary activities against Cuba in the 1960s, Reagan appointed 
Jorge Mas Canosa as a member of the Presidential Commission on Broad-
casting to Cuba and president of ABCB. Echoing Wick, Mas Canosa stated 
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that “like Radio Marti, TV Marti will broadcast live news and entertain-
ment into Cuba from the free for the first time in 30 years” (USHR, 1988, 
p. 48). Under Mas Canosa, ABCB (1991, p. 10) claimed that “watching TV 
Marti is an act of civil disobedience in Cuba, as is listening to Radio Mar-
ti,” and that “TV Marti is a worthwhile and cost-effective investment in 
the security of this hemisphere,” the latter point justifying economic ex-
pense with political goals. ABCB included American public figures nomi-
nated by Reagan, some with a history of involvement in Cold War and Cu-
ban policy, including telecommunications expert James Skinner, president 
of Boston University John Silber, investment banker and advertising exec-
utive Danford L. Sawyer, US foreign service officer Joseph F. Glennon, act-
ing director of TV Marti and former director of the Office of Cuba Broad-
casting Antonio Navarro, trustee of Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Midge 
Decter, Republican party consultant and campaign manager F. Clifton 
White, and Joseph Coors, whose beer dynasty has been implicated in poli-
cies that “undermine democratic pluralism” (Bellant, 1990). According to 
congressman Larry Smith (D-Florida), “for 5 years Radio Marti has broad-
cast uncensored news and information that, because of Castro’s censor-
ship, the people of Cuba could not get any other way. Now TV Marti is car-
rying on that tradition, providing free flow of information, images, and 
entertainment” (ABCB, 1989a, p. 3).
Opportunities for cultural exchange were overshadowed by politics: 
ABCB rejected as “unacceptable” suggestions by the Cuban government 
for an exchange of programs and reciprocal broadcasts, claiming that it 
gave Castro the power of “de facto censorship” over programming (ABCB, 
1989a, p. 8).   
The Cuba broadcasts had strong support in the US executive branch. 
In his term as Vice President under Reagan, George Bush supported Radio 
Marti during the 1982 congressional debates by stating that “Radio Marti 
must pass. It was created by a vision of this administration” (Cuban Amer-
ican Foundation [CAF], 1991, p. 19). After the bill passed, Bush noted that 
“we see Radio Marti as the voice of truth in Cuba. Castro’s response to Ra-
dio Marti shows how dangerous truth can be to a dictator” (CAF, 1991, p. 
23). In 1990, as US President, Bush addressed the National Association of 
Broadcasters (NAB) about TV Marti, reiterating the rationale for Cuba 
broadcasting: “From Havana to Prague to Phnom Penh, the peoples of 
these lands never fully gave in to the amnesia [of their history and tradi-
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tions] because even in the worst hours of repression, they could always 
count on a friendly voice to remind them of the truth: Radio Marti, Radio 
Liberty, Radio Free Europe - and, God bless it, the Voice of America” (CAF, 
1991, pp. 61-2). Continuing his Cold War accolade, Bush claimed that “in 
the realm of ideas and ideals, there are no borders. No government should 
fear free speech, whether it’s from entertainment programs or accurate, 
unbiased news about world events. And that is why Congress strongly 
supported TV Marti and why I strongly support TV Marti. The voice of 
freedom will not be stilled as long as there is an American to tell the 
truth.” Bush coopted opponents by saying that dissent represents “the 
very principle TV Marti exists to serve - that free flow of ideas.” He con-
cluded by urging NAB to “stand for TV Marti and to stand for freedom.” 
On the eve of the 1992 Florida primary, Bush penned an op-ed in the Mi-
ami Herald that embodies a single-minded intransigence on relations with 
Cuba, stating that “Cuba will also be free” and that “we have no intention 
of agreeing to a normal relationship.” As testimony to faith in this posi-
tion, Bush made a campaign promise in 1992 that, “I’ll be the first presi-
dent to visit a free and democratic Cuba” (Masland, 1992, p. 44). Bush lost 
the election, but Cold War rhetoric was not confined to supporters of Radio 
and TV Marti; it pervaded programming policies of the broadcasters.
PROGRAMMING POLICY FOR BROADCASTING TO CUBA
During the formative years of Radio and TV Marti, the Presidential 
Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba (PCBC) proposed programming poli-
cies, noting that to “attract and keep the audience for the news and views 
segments, Radio Marti should also be entertaining, while seeking to fill 
voids left by communist censorship,” and “music should play a major role” 
since “popular American and Latin Top 40 hits are not aired in Cuba, yet 
Cuban youth are as enamored of their generation’s rhythms and songs as 
are their counterparts elsewhere.” The PCBC suggested that “music and 
cultural programs” should be “designed to attract the widest possible lis-
tenership in Cuba” (PCBC, 1982, pp. 19, 26). Some of PCBC’s points are 
disputable.
Cuba had been receiving quite a bit of American programming, includ-
ing American and Latin music broadcasts, which have always been part of 
the “musical pluralism in revolutionary Cuba,” according to ethnomusicol-
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ogist Peter Manuel (1991, pp. 283-311). Sociomusicologist Charles Keil, 
who visited Cuba during the 1980s, also observed a wide variety of music 
and entertainment, including American programming (Keil, 1987). Simi-
larly, Acosta (1991) has produced a nuanced and locally informed study of 
music and media in Cuba from the 1960s through the 1980s that covers 
radio and television, and notes a variety of musical styles from popular to 
classical. Cuba also had a vibrant cinema industry and dynamic video 
movement, the latter with over 1000 video halls featuring locally produced 
content (Laird & Hall, 1992). Rather than consulting scholars and musi-
cologists, Radio and TV Marti relied on a selectively informed vision of en-
tertainment in Cuba.
To inform programming policy, ABCB conducted surveys of recent ar-
rivals from Cuba using a “perception analyzer,” a dubious “portable data 
collection device which, connected to a hand held dial, instantaneously and 
continuously records subjects’ reactions to any audio or visual material,” 
which are “fed directly into a central computer for real-time analysis.” One 
study suggested that “a music video program would attract a large audi-
ence among the youth” (ABCB, 1989b, p. 10). Another concluded that 
“there was a great demand for pure entertainment, perhaps in protest and 
reaction to the extreme degree of politicization to which the Cuban govern-
ment has subjected common actions of daily life in Cuba,” insisting that 
“entertainment programs can offer the Cuban people new perspectives 
and ways to live than those found in Cuba” (USHR, 1988, pp. 86-7). But 
“pure entertainment” is problematic, as it implies US policies are apoliti-
cal.
A quarterly report by the Office of Research and Policy for the Staff of 
Radio Marti (ORPSRM) suggested that a 1988 Cuban cultural event, Ex-
poCuba, be reported in a way that counters its promotion by Fidel Castro. 
The report noted that ExpoCuba seemed to “reflect capabilities and repre-
sent accomplishments the Cuban government would probably very much 
like to see duplicated in other sectors of the economy,” which may “repre-
sent a welcome source of revolutionary pride and patriotism” in a country 
where “three decades of revolutionary economics have led to chronic short-
falls in domestic production, scarce supplies of foreign exchange, and the 
strict rationing of food and many consumer goods” (ORPSRM, 1989, pp. 
115-16).
In a report on Radio Marti, ABCB alleged that its success was “due in 
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large part to precise program targeting based on in-depth audience re-
search,” which provided “flexibility to change in harmony with the unique 
requirements and interests of the Cuban people.” For TV Marti, ABCB 
noted that “a variety of information, sports and entertainment program-
ming... were selected on the basis of their ability to correct purposely dis-
torted perceptions of American culture in Cuban society.” Claiming that 
Cuban media distort the truth does not preclude similar distortions in the 
US media, nor do Americans have a lock on the concept of truth. For exam-
ple, ABCB suggested that Radio Marti report the controversial 1989 Amer-
ican invasion and occupation of Panama as a form of “liberation” that will 
provide an “opportunity for democratic choices” (ABCB, 1989, pp. 9, 12, 18-
19).
Since there is a close relationship between Cuba broadcasting and 
VOA, the latter’s programming policies deserve scrutiny. To VOA, music 
plays an “important role” because “music is a universal language, through 
which we communicate the rich heritage of America’s past as well as the 
diversity and liveliness of America today” (VOA, 1983a, p. IV-8). This mis-
sion informed Radio and TV Marti’s aim of correcting Cuba’s allegedly dis-
torted view of American culture. To do this, VOA staff “keeps up with all 
the top tunes and albums on the American hit charts” (VOA, 1983b, p. IV-
3). As we will see, the Cold War ideology distorted this material and the 
emphasis on politics missed opportunities for cultural exchange. At the 
time, 99% of American programming was domestic, compared to 70% in 
Cuba (Laird & Hall, 1992), so one could say that Americans are provincial 
and might benefit more from reciprocal exchanges.
By the time Radio and TV Marti launched, VOA music libraries cata-
logued over 150,000 recordings, including popular and classical music and 
ethnic recordings. VOA has an arrangement with ASCAP and BMI to use 
recordings without paying fees, and also records performances in its own 
studios. VOA programming policy regarding music is explicit: “There 
should always be a reason for playing a music feature - it should comple-
ment adjacent material or be used because it is topical,” and “music should 
always have a specific purpose.” To insure correct usage of music, the VOA 
music director decides “every aspect of music programming from the selec-
tion of themes and bridges to the production of music series” and “cover-
age of major events” (VOA, 1992, pp. 7, 40, 42, 74, 84). Emphasis on a “spe-
cific purpose” for music is also found in the VOA producers handbook 
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(1983b, p. II-8). The Television and Film Service of USIA “produces, ac-
quires, and adapts films and videotape productions to help advance US 
foreign policy, economic and cultural objectives abroad” (USHR, 1990, p. 
692). This purposeful focus contradicts USIA claims that Radio and TV 
Marti provide “pure entertainment,” suggesting a double standard when 
Cuba is criticized by the US government for providing politicized enter-
tainment. 
PROGRAMMING CONTENT FOR BROADCASTING TO CUBA
A closer look at USIA’s “pure entertainment” suggests the ideological 
basis of its programming. Being a centralized government agency, USIA 
published and shipped catalogues to posts worldwide. The United States 
Information Service (USIS), a branch of USIA, published an annotated 
catalogue of video programs, some made in-house, that advance US foreign 
policy, including economic and cultural objectives abroad. A brief look at 
materials offered by these agencies may help to understand the view of 
American culture that the US government wishes to project, this being a 
prime goal of USIA, including Radio and TV Marti.
The music section of the USIS video catalogue includes programs 
about American folk music, but it excludes or downplays selected artists. 
For example, despite the enormous influence of folk singer Pete Seeger 
within America’s “musical mosaic” (Seeger, 1991), he is not included. Per-
haps this is because Seeger is not in line with the US ideological position 
toward Cuba. The USIA Cuba Annual Report for 1985 stated that “wheth-
er or not they are stars to the Cuban people, Pete Seeger and Dizzy 
Gillespie made the scene [in Cuba] in February,” noting that “in bold head-
lines Granma (16 Feb. 1985, p. 4) informs its readers that Seeger has said: 
‘Con los versos de Jose Marti empiezo mi educacion sobre America Latin’” 
(as cited by ORPSRM, 1985, p. 52). This quote, translated as “With the 
verses of Jose Marti I began my education of Latin America,” is ironic 
since it suggests a double standard regarding Jose Marti and Pete Seeger. 
Seeger quotes Marti, whose visage has already been coopted for the pur-
pose of US propaganda in Cuba, while at the same time Seeger’s music is 
absent in USIA’s representation of American culture.
A similar selectivity is evident in the legacy of Afro-Americans. Jazz 
artist Dizzy Gillespie has had more contact with Cubans than any other 
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American musician, and stated in a Cuban documentary that the roots of 
jazz are inextricably tied to Cuban music. However, like Seeger, Gillespie 
is virtually absent from the music prescribed for Cuba. The USIA cata-
logue does list a program entitled “Jazz Casual,” a 1967 film featuring the 
Dizzy Gillespie Quintet, but the entry says “no TV broadcast, English 
only” (USIA, 1987b, p. 561). The only reference to Gillespie in USIA’s offi-
cial sourcebook on Afro-American culture is a photo in “Bert Goldblatt’s 
Gallery” showing Gillespie “reverently holding the child of Charlie Parker” 
(USIA, 1985a). Nor does the sourcebook refer to rap music or the Islamic 
component in Afro-American history. Although he might have embraced 
the appellation, Malcolm X is referred to as a “radical militant,” while 
Martin Luther King’s message is undermined, suggesting that USIA is 
aligned with the tendency in American political discourse to whitewash 
the politics of Afro-Americans, as noted by Fresia (1987). Regarding its en-
dorsement criteria, the sourcebook is cryptic: “Value judgments and com-
parisons in the literature have been made to provide the posts with addi-
tional selection criteria” and that “it is hoped that this bibliography and 
commentary will provide posts with as nearly as possible a comprehensive 
selection and program tool” (USIA, 1985a, pp. i-ii). 
In addition to this selectivity, the USIS 1989 Video Library Catalogue 
listed materials produced by USIA for use in programming that provide 
further evidence of its Cold War ideology. “Artist in Exile,” a documentary 
about the cellist Mstislav Rostropovich, “chronicles his life in Stalin’s Rus-
sia, through his brilliant performing career to his sudden ‘official with-
drawal’,” and depicts him performing at the White House. This program, 
unlike the Gillespie one mentioned earlier, includes full TV broadcast 
rights and is available in several languages, including Spanish. Another 
USIA program features three American ethnomusicologists, Paul Berliner, 
Roderic Knight, and Lois Anderson, speaking about “new trends in Afro-
American Music” (USIS Video Library, 1989, p. 155), although no mention 
is made of older Afro-American traditions. A program entitled “Old Songs 
in the New World” recalls that “early settlers who came to America 
brought with them their songs and prayers of hope and courage for the 
new adventure,” which reflected the “hardships and joys of setting up a 
new life in a new land” and the “Revolutionary War spirit and life on the 
frontier - all with a distinctly American flavor.” This program points to an-
other exclusion from USIA offerings: Native Americans. Perhaps the cul-
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ture of Native Americans and early Afro-Americans was too close to the 
American legacy of colonialism, genocide, and slavery for USIA’s definition 
of “pure entertainment.”
A view of USIA’s international fair is offered in a retrospective publi-
cation, which notes that in 1967 USIS “introduced the idea of singing com-
mercials to be aired by radio stations throughout Laos” featuring a local 
rock group performing the song “Grow More” encouraging Laotians to 
grow more rice, and another suggesting that the local “government helps 
provide your needs” (USIA, 1983, p. 17). USIA international programs fea-
ture tours of “artistic ambassadors,” including pianists playings world pre-
miers by American composers Benjamin Lees and Elie Siegmeister (USIA 
Update, December 1985), and a violin/piano duo that “took Jakarta and 
Yogyakarta by storm” (USIA Update, September 1987). VOA aired a live 
concert by country music star Charlie Daniels with commentary in Eng-
lish, Polish, and Spanish (USIA Update, May 1984). USIA and USIS also 
sponsor scholars, such as Andy Kaye’s tour of Africa lecturing on American 
music. 
The programmers of Radio and TV Marti have the above mentioned 
materials at their disposal, but additional resources are produced for its 
audience, such as “In a place without a soul: The testimony of former Cu-
ban political prisoners,” which features essays, poems, and commentary, 
and refers to Cuban poet Angel Cuadra as “a virtual hostage in Havana: 
his plight is reminiscent of Soviet intellectuals - refuseniks - who are de-
nied permission from the Soviet authorities to emigrate” (USIA, 1985b, p. 
46-7).
Advisors for broadcasting to Cuba prescribe programs that, according 
to dubious emigre audience studies, are necessary to maintain local rele-
vance, including Dos a las Dos (Two at Two), a daily potpouri of humor, 
news, and music; Art de Vivir (Art of Living), featuring a psychologist 
speaking on mental and emotional health; a selection of Novelas, or soap 
operas, that “keep Cubans glued to their radios”; Puente Familiar (Family 
Bridge) offering daily pre-recorded toll-free phone messages from Cubans 
in America as the “only link between hundreds of separated families”; Mu-
sic for Youth, including over a dozen music shows geared to 18-24 year 
olds that “runs the gamut from rock ‘n’ roll to samba” and stars a former 
Cuban disc jockey; Mesa Redonda (Roundtable), featuring “experts on in-
ternational issues and social trends in Cuba”; and Cuba sin Censura 
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(Cuba Without Censorship). Scheduling is carefully controlled by the pro-
gram director (ABCB, 1989b, p. 9). A proposal submitted at a USHR hear-
ing suggested that TV Marti should directly compete with Cuban pro-
grams airing at the same time, such as by putting “Bailables USA” in the 
same time slot as a movie on Tele Rebelde and the Manana Es Domingo 
show on Canal 6, and reminded programmers that music videos should be 
used as fillers between information programs (USHR, 1988, pp. 88-90).
The producers and managers of Radio and TV Marti have also con-
tributed suggestions for programming, many driven by their own ideologi-
cal and political concerns. Ernesto Betancourt, the founding director of Ra-
dio Marti (who resigned in 1990), stated in an interview that members of 
Jorge Mas Canosa’s Cuban American Foundation “drafted a constitution 
and economic program for the country and plans for transitional rule with 
Jorge Mas the prospective presidential candidate,” for which they “needed 
mass-media broadcast to Cuba to realize their ambitions.” Betancourt also 
revealed that Mas Canosa “requested a 55-minute documentary on East-
ern Europe for the station, and recently arranged for the broadcast of flat-
tering commentary” about the Cuban American Foundation (French, 
1990b). Mas Canosa died in 1997, which conceivably would have mitigated 
some of the more direct political influences on broadcasting into Cuba, al-
though as the recent debates suggest Radio and TV Marti remain contest-
ed territory.
CONCLUSION
The current debates on Radio and TV Marti are polarized between 
those who support broadcasting to Cuba on political grounds rooted in the 
Cold War tropes of freedom and truth, and those who question the broad-
casts on economic grounds. The Cold War is over, the Soviet Union is gone 
and communism and socialism seem to be in global retreat, at least on the 
level of the state. Even during the Cold War period the US certainly had 
no exclusive right to the concepts of freedom and truth, and it has become 
untenable today to rely on these political slogans to justify broadcasting to 
Cuba. In a multi-polar and multicultural world, heavy handed efforts to 
tell people how to think or what information to access will often ring hol-
low, especially when double standards are evident. However, perhaps more 
importantly, to justify the opposition to Radio and TV Marti in economic 
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terms is equally misguided. Both positions missed a crucial third point.
Although the question of cultural exchange was raised by each side of 
the debate during the formative years of Radio and TV Marti, this dimen-
sion of broadcasting to Cuba has been undermined by the obsession with 
politics and economics. Cross-cultural exchange and intercultural dialogue 
are needed as much today as they were in the past, perhaps even more. 
Media and communications are more open today than during the Cold 
War, and they remain important channels for cross-cultural interaction, 
but these channels need nurturing and support. Rather than cutting fund-
ing for existing media and broadcasting, they can be reconfigured out of 
the Cold War mold and into an opportunity to foster dialogue and mutual 
understanding between Americans and Cubans. The pursuit of political or 
economic interests in the debates and polices on Radio and TV Marti un-
dermined the possibility for developing opportunities for cultural aware-
ness and exchange. This cannot be mended by cutting much needed fund-
ing, but by abandoning the politicization of media and embracing it as a 
venue for mutual understanding.
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